

\*\*\*\*\* T O P S E C R E T \*\*\*\*\*S C O P Y

25X1

130222Z

O 102128Z MAY 74 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM

TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

T O P S E C R E T SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

25X1

WH41261

TDHAK144

MORI/CDF  
C03344745

DELIVER TO BREMER/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY.

MAY 10, 1974

TO: SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM: DICK SMYER  
RICHARD SOLOMON

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS  
APPLY.

SUBJECT: MOVING ON UN COMMAND NEGOTIATIONS

1. ON THE BASIS OF AMBASSADOR HABIB'S SUCCESSFUL PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS IN SEOUL ON THE FUTURE OF THE UN COMMAND, AS WELL AS YOUR REMARKS TO PRC VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAD-PING ON KOREA, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO INITIATE DIPLOMATIC SCENARIO WITH THE CHINESE AND NORTH KOREANS SHORTLY AFTER YOUR RETURN TO WASHINGTON. FAILURE TO GET CONTACTS UNDERWAY AT AN EARLY DATE RISKS HAVING THIS ISSUE DRAGGED INTO PRELIMINARY PLANNING FOR THE FALL UNGA SESSION, JEOPARDIZING OUR HOPES TO KEEP THE UNC NEGOTIATIONS OUT OF THE GA IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. (A PRELIMINARY AGENDA FOR THE GA WILL BE WORKED UP IN EARLY JULY.) SMYER, SOLOMON, HUMMER AND SNEIDER REVIEWED THE SITUATION THIS MORNING, AND PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING SCENARIO DESIGNED TO IMPLEMENT YOUR PREVIOUS GUIDANCE.

State Dept review  
completed

2. SHORTLY AFTER YOUR RETURN TO WASHINGTON, YOU WOULD MEET WITH HUANG CHEN AND FORMALLY NOTIFY HIM OF OUR POSITION ON THE FUTURE OF THE UNC. (WE ARE NOW PREPARING TALKING POINTS FOR SUCH A MEETING. YOU MIGHT ALSO USE THIS SESSION TO BRIEF HUANG ON YOUR MIDDLE EAST TRIP.)

3. SHORTLY AFTER YOUR DISCUSSION WITH THE CHINESE, THE SOUTH

\*\*\*\*\* \* W H S R C O M M E N T \* \*\*\*\*\*

SEC FILE

PSN:037502

PAGE 01

TOR:130/21:57Z

DTG:102128Z MAY 74

\*\*\*\*\* T O P S E C R E T \*\*\*\*\*S C O P Y

\*\*\*\*\* T O P S E C R E T \*\*\*\*\*S COPY

KOREANS WOULD MAKE A PRIVATE APPROACH TO THE NORTH WITH OUR JOINT PACKAGE PROPOSAL. IN THIS REGARD, STATE FEELS IT IS ADVISABLE TO PRIME AMBASSADOR HABIB ON OUR SCENARIO SO THAT HE WILL BE PREPARED TO MOVE THE ROK TOWARD A DIRECT APPROACH TO THE NORTH SHORTLY AFTER YOUR MEETING WITH THE CHINESE.

4. AS YOU KNOW, THE KOREANS FIRST ASKED THAT WE SECURE BASIC AGREEMENT FROM THE CHINESE ON OUR UNC PACKAGE BEFORE THEY APPROACH THE NORTH. THEY SUBSEQUENTLY BACKED OFF THIS POSITION, BUT STATE FEELS THEY ARE STILL WORBLY -- WHICH IS A FURTHER REASON FOR HABIB BEING IN A POSITION TO SHAPE THEIR THINKING ON OUR SCENARIO. WE CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF ASKING THE PRC FOR A GENERAL REACTION TO OUR PROPOSAL BEFORE SUGGESTING TO SEOUL THAT THEY CONTACT THE NORTH, BUT FEEL THIS APPROACH WOULD BE UNWISE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: IT WOULD CONVEY TO THE CHINESE AN AIR OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT OUR PROPOSAL, AND THUS INVITE A COUNTER-PROPOSAL BEFORE THE TWO KOREAN STATES HAD BEGUN TALKS. THIS WOULD UNDERCUT OUR EFFORT TO HAVE SEOUL AND PYONGYANG CARRY THE MAJOR BURDEN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND PUT THE U.S. AND PRC IN A "COLLUDING" ROLE THAT PEKING MIGHT FIND DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT. AT A TACTICAL LEVEL, A PRELIMINARY SOUNDING WITH THE PRC WOULD GIVE THE NORTH -- WHO PEKING WOULD PRESUMABLY INFORM OF OUR APPROACH -- THE ADDED ADVANTAGE OF TIME TO PREPARE A RESPONSE TO SEOUL BEFORE THE ROK HAD MADE A DIRECT APPROACH TO THEM. WHILE IN THEORY IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO BE ABLE TO REACH A COORDINATED POSITION WITH PEKING BEFORE SEOUL APPROACHES PYONGYANG, IN PRACTISE WE DOUBT THAT AN EFFORT IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD WORK TO OUR ADVANTAGE.

5. YOU WOULD INFORM THE SOVIETS OF OUR GENERAL POSITION ON THE UNC AT YOUR NEXT MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN. WHILE WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL PLAY A SPOILING ROLE, THEY ARE LIKELY TO LEARN ABOUT OUR APPROACH TO PEKING FROM THE NORTH KOREANS IN SHORT ORDER ANYWAY, AND IT IS BEST THAT THEY HEAR OF OUR PLANS FROM YOU DIRECTLY.

6. SNEIDER WILL BE IN TOKYO IN EARLY JUNE AND CAN INFORM THE JAPANESE IN A GENERAL WAY ABOUT THE UNC NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECURE MANNER AT THAT TIME. INGERSOLL AND HUMMEL WILL BE IN LONDON IN EARLY JUNE, AND CAN INFORM THE BRITISH AT THAT TIME. WE BELIEVE IT USEFUL TO INFORM THESE GOVERNMENTS AT AN EARLY DATE, GIVEN THE ASSISTANCE THEY CAN PROVIDE IN HANDLING THE KOREA ISSUE IN THE UN, AND IN VIEW OF TOKYO'S GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN KOREA WHICH AFFECT ITS SECURITY.

7. REQUEST YOUR AUTHORIZATION NOW (A) TO SET UP AN APPOINTMENT FOR YOU WITH HUANG CHEN WITHIN A WEEK OF YOUR

PSN:037502

PAGE 02

TOR:130/21:57Z

DTG:102128Z MAY 74

\*\*\*\*\* T O P S E C R E T \*\*\*\*\*S COPY



\*\*\*\*\* T O P S E C R E T \*\*\*\*\*S CDPV

RETURN, (B) FOR THE DEPARTMENT INFORM AMBASSADOR HABIB OF  
OUR GENERAL SCENARIO SO THAT HE WILL BE PREPARED TO MOVE THE  
ROKS TO APPROACH THE NORTH WITHIN A FEW DAYS AFTER YOUR  
DISCUSSION WITH HUANG CHEN,

WARM REGARDS.

756

PSN:037502 PAGE 03 OF 03 TOR:130721:57Z DTG:102128Z MAY 74

\*\*\*\*\* T O P S E C R E T \*\*\*\*\*S CDPV